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INTRODUCTION

The recent Supreme Court case Monasky v. Taglieri sets
a uniform approach for determining the habitual residence
of children for the purposes of the Hague Convention of 25
October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction. 1 Prior to the Court’s decision, American courts
took varying approaches to habitual residence, applying the
1. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719 (2020); Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
11343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention entered into force
for the United States on July 1, 1988. Status Table, HCCH, https://www.hcch.
net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
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parental intent approach, the child-centered approach, and
the mixed approach. The Court clarified that the habitual
residence analysis includes more than express parental
agreement, but this Comment argues that the totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry must take a sufficiently narrow
approach to avoid frustrating the aims of the Convention.
While the analysis requires more than parental intent or
agreement, factual inquiries into the child’s acclimatization
must not cross into substantive custody determinations.
The Convention seeks “to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State; and to ensure that rights of custody and
of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” 2 This
international treaty creates a civil mechanism for the prompt
return of children who “have been removed from or retained
outside of their country of habitual residence in violation of
custodial rights.” 3 According to the Convention’s philosophy,
the summary return mechanism allows the most appropriate
courts—the courts in the country of the child’s habitual
residence—to determine custody issues. The legal
framework provides a remedy for the violation of the leftbehind parent’s custody rights, and the prompt return of the
child deters child abduction by preventing abductors from
profiting from their wrongdoing. Since entering into force,
“the Convention has proven to be one of the most effective
tools available for parents or legal guardians to seek the

2. Convention, supra note 1. The International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (ICARA) implements the Convention in the United States and grants both
federal and state courts jurisdiction over international child abduction cases. 22
U.S.C. § 9003(a). The Convention only applies between Contracting States. See
Convention, supra note 1. For information on the United States’ contracting
partners as of 2020 as well as on the Convention generally, see U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 6 (2020).
Additionally, “parents can also seek access to their children across international
borders under the Convention.” Id. at 5.
3. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 5.

916

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

return of their abducted children.” 4 In 2015, the United
States Department of State reported parents abducted over
six hundred children from the United States to another
country, so the Convention remains an important
mechanism for safeguarding the best interests of children. 5
Since the Convention does not define habitual residence,
the analysis has evolved over time. Originally, the drafters
of the Convention envisaged a remedy for custodial parents
in abductions by noncustodial parents, so a child’s habitual
residence appeared obvious: a child’s habitual residence was
just their home. 6 The Convention would protect children
after the abductor removed them from their primary
caretaker. The drafters intended to prevent the noncustodial
parent from uprooting the child from where the parents
decided the child would live. Over time, courts have found
that, in addition to parental intent, a child may become
habitually resident in a country due to his or her ties and
acclimatization, with the caveat that courts should avoid the
kind of complicated analyses used for domicile. 7 Lower
4. Id. The Convention seeks to return children quickly, but unfortunately, a
prompt return is not always possible. See Eric Lesh, Jurisdiction Friction and the
Frustration of the Hague Convention: Why International Child Abduction Cases
Should Be Heard Exclusively by Federal Courts, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 170, 174 (2011)
(discussing “the slowness of the American system” in Convention cases).
5. Rachel Koehn, Comment, Family Law Frustrations: Addressing Hague
Convention Issues in Federal Courts, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 636, 637 (2017).
According to the 2020 Annual Report, 220 abducted children were returned to
the United States in 2019, the majority (160) coming from Convention countries.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 8 (2020).
6. See generally Adair Dyer, Report on International Child Abduction By One
Parent (‘Legal Kidnapping’), in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, III ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION 10, 23 (1982)
[hereinafter Dyer Report]. Dyer prepared his report as part of the preparatory
work for the Convention (the “travaux préparatoires”). The Travaux
Préparatoires are official documents recording the negotiations, drafting, and
discussions during the process of creating a treaty. These documents may be
consulted and taken into consideration when interpreting treaties. See Collected
Travaux Préparatoires, LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, YALE L. SCH.,
https://library.law.yale.edu/collected-travaux-preparatoires (last visited Apr. 11,
2022).
7. Rhona Schuz, Policy Considerations in Determining the Habitual
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courts’ divergent approaches to habitual residence created a
tension between focusing on parental intent versus the
child’s integration that existed until the Court harmonized
the analysis in Monasky.
This Comment focuses on Monasky’s uniform approach
for determining the habitual residence of children and
advocates for a mixed approach. The Court found that
habitual residence does not require an actual agreement
about where a child lives, but rather depends on the factual
circumstances. 8 While the Court clarified that parental
intent is only one factor in the habitual residence analysis
and that no one factor is dispositive under the mixed
approach, lower courts must be careful not to turn the
analysis into a domicile-like inquiry or stray into substantive
custody determinations. This Comment considers how courts
have applied Monasky and whether or not the case law
requires further clarification.
Part I puts the case into context by explaining the origin
and policies of the Convention before turning to the preMonasky case law in the United States. Next, Part II
addresses the background to and decision in Monasky, along
with the application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test
in subsequent case law. Finally, Part III addresses the status
of the habitual residence analysis post-Monasky by
Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
101, 105–06 (2001); see PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 89 (1999) (comparing the
simplicity and flexibility of habitual residence as opposed to domicile); Tai
Vivatvaraphol, Note, Back to Basics: Determining A Child’s Habitual Residence
in International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3338–39 (2009) (discussing the decision not to define
“habitual residence” in order to ensure flexibility in its application). For
information on domicile in conflict of laws in the United States, see generally Mo
Zhang, Habitual Residence v. Domicile: A Challenge Facing American Conflict of
Laws, 70 ME. L. REV. 161 (2018). Domicile is the principal connecting factor for
conflict of laws in the United States, involving “an enduring and persistent
relationship” between a person and a place. Id. at 189. It requires presence and
intent to remain.
8. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 726 (2020).
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discussing the best approach to habitual residence, the
merits of the totality-of-the-circumstances test and its
subsequent application, and the habitual residence analysis
moving forward.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1980 HAGUE ABDUCTION
CONVENTION

Section I.A addresses the origins and policy behind the
Convention. Section I.B outlines the three approaches to
habitual residence in the United States prior to Monasky: the
child-centered, parental intent, and mixed approaches.
A. The Origins and Policy Behind the 1980 Hague
Abduction Convention
Several factors led to the increase in international child
abductions in the late twentieth century that necessitated
drafting the Convention, including improved international
transportation and communication, relaxed visa restrictions
in some regions, and increased mobility in labor
internationally. 9 Additionally, most international child
abductions occur in “international” families, and in the lead
up to the Convention, the Dyer Report noted an increase in
marriages between persons from different countries as well
as a general trend in countries granting divorces. 10 Certain
circumstances create the perfect storm for international
child abduction, such as the breakdown of the parents’
relationship, cultural differences, fear or frustration, and
opportunity. 11 Frustration may come from a lack of control,
and a parent might fear losing their child due to the other
parent’s “home court” advantage, the other parent’s financial
9. Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 18. In private international law, “child
abduction” refers to “the unilateral removal or retention of children by parents,
guardians or close family members” as distinct from “classic kidnapping” by third
parties. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 1.
10. Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 19; see, e.g., BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra
note 7, at 2 n.10 (discussing the increase in divorces in the United Kingdom).
11. Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 20.
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security, or fears that the other parent will take away the
child. In any case, the abductor must believe that they will
profit from their wrongdoing. 12 The Convention aimed to
combat the growing problem of international child abduction
through “concerted cooperation pursuant to an international
agreement.” 13
Dyer noted that a key factor in international child
abduction is the frustration of a non-custodial parent “when
unjustifiably deprived of the right of visitation with the
child” in addition to “the slowness, expense and inefficacy of
legal proceedings concerning custody of the child.” 14 In the
1970’s, children lived in the matrimonial home or, after a
marriage broke down, with the parent who had custody, so
habitual residence was a clear question of fact for the
drafters. 15 The prevailing view at the time indicated that
12. Id.
13. See 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(3) (“International abductions and retentions of
children are increasing, and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an
international agreement can effectively combat this problem.”).
14. Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 19; see Melissa A. Kucinski, The Future of
Litigating an International Child Abduction Case in the United States, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 31, 65 (2020) (noting the “original view that child
abductions were going to be a situation of non-custodial fathers ferreting away
their children overseas”). An abductor may believe they are doing what is best for
the child to protect them or to give them a better life, but the left-behind parent
may see it as some kind of retaliation for the failed relationship. See BEAUMONT
& MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 11.
15. Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, III ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION 426,
445 (1982) [hereinafter Pérez-Vera Report] (noting that a child’s habitual
residence is “a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile.”); C
v. S [1990] 2 All ER 961, 965 (Eng. HL) (suggesting courts should interpret a
child’s habitual residence according to “the ordinary and natural meaning of the
two words . . . is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the
circumstances of any particular case.”); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at
3; see also Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 46 (referencing a newspaper article
describing an “organised effort by divorced and unmarried Danish fathers to
enable them to kidnap their children and remove them abroad, for the purpose of
obtaining custody”); Pérez-Vera Report, supra, at 451. The Pérez-Vera Report is
the Explanatory Report to the Convention. The Explanatory Reports on each of
the HCCH instruments are aimed at providing information to the public as to the
sense intended by the Diplomatic representatives for a particular instrument.
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“children were primarily abducted by the non-custodial
parent,” and findings that more men abducted children than
women supported the stereotype at the time that
noncustodial parents abducted children. 16 The travaux
préparatoires for the Convention repeatedly refer to the
abductor as the non-custodial parent. 17 For example, the
Dyer Report describes the simplest format for an
international child abduction: the custodial parent sends the
child to the country where the “would-be abductor” lives for
a temporary visit. 18
The Convention presumes that children need stability in
their lives and that the legal standard for deciding cases
should be the “best interests of the child.” 19 In most cases,
wrongfully removing or retaining a child in a new
jurisdiction detrimentally effects the child. 20 The “true victim
of the ‘childnapping’ is the child himself” since the abduction
suddenly upsets the child’s stability, cuts off contact with the
primary caretaker, creates uncertainty and frustration when
the child must adapt to a new language and culture, and
introduces
previously
unknown
relatives. 21
Some
See generally Pérez-Vera Report, supra.
16. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 8–9 (regarding statistics in
abduction cases). Despite the belief that the perpetrators in international child
abduction cases were fathers dissatisfied with the custody arrangement at the
time of the abduction, cases show “[w]rongful removals and retention are now
more likely to be brought about by mothers who may have moved abroad with
the father of their children but who subsequently wish to return to their country
of origin.” Id. at 3–4. For example, from 1989–1998, out of forty-five cases in the
United States, only fifteen abductions (33 percent) were carried out by fathers.
Id. at 9. However, in 1994, fathers accounted for sixty-eight percent of abductors
in non-Convention cases in the United States. Id. at 10. Today, the majority belief
is that children benefit from having contact with both parents. Id.
17. Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 41.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 22. It is not always clear what is in the best interests of the child,
and, in practice, courts have great discretion in deciding such cases based on
moral and social values. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 2.
20. See generally BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7.
21. Dyer Report, supra note 6, at 21.
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commentators compare child abduction to child abuse, even
in the absence of actual physical abuse or neglect, so the
longer a parent wrongfully retains a child, the greater the
risk of causing the child psychological harm. 22 As a result,
wrongfully removing or retaining a child presumptively goes
against that child’s best interests, and the Convention
promotes the best interests of children by returning them to
their habitual residence as quickly as possible to avoid
uprooting the child twice. 23 Essentially, the longer it takes
courts to decide whether to return the child, the more likely
it will be that the child has adjusted to their new
environment. Instead of focusing on the welfare of individual
children, the Convention promotes the best interests of
children generally by promptly returning to the preabduction status quo, which also deters potential
abductors. 24
In addition to promoting the best interests of the child,
the prompt return of the child serves other policy goals. First,
sending children back as quickly as possible as a general rule
discourages would-be abductors from unilaterally removing
a child as a form of forum shopping to get the best outcome
in custody cases. 25 If an abductor knows courts will order the
22. Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from
Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 617 (2000); Dyer Report, supra note
6, at 23 (“The length of time which elapses between the abduction and the
ultimate resolution of the custody dispute has a strong influence on the nature
and the persistence of the effects on the child.”).
23. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 15, at 432; see Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,
572 U.S. 1, 5 (2014); Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 180 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“The driving objective of the [Convention] is to facilitate custody
adjudications, promptly and exclusively, in the place where the child habitually
resides.”).
24. Schuz, supra note 7, at 111; see Vivatvaraphol, supra note 7, at 3334 (“The
deliberate wording of Article 1 (‘prompt’) ensured that courts in international
child abduction proceedings no longer engaged in lengthy and detailed
investigations into the best interests of the child.”).
25. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 7, at 3336; Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich II),
78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The . . . Convention is generally intended to
restore the pre-abduction status quo and to deter parents from crossing borders
in search of a more sympathetic court.”).
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return of the child as a general rule, then the abductor will
not attempt to unilaterally change the custody arrangement
by choosing a sympathetic forum. Second, promptly
returning children to their place of habitual residence
promotes certainty and predictability in the application of
the Convention. 26 To achieve its aims, courts in Contracting
States must uniformly interpret and apply the Convention. 27
With these policy goals in mind, the drafters decided on
certain guiding provisions in the Convention. To order a
child’s return under the Convention, the removal or
retention must be wrongful. 28 Under Article 3 of the
Convention, a removal or retention of a child is wrongful
when it is “in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person . . . under the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident.” 29 The Convention thus requires that an
abductor remove or retain a child from their State of habitual
residence and that the removal or retention breach the leftbehind parent’s custody rights under the law of that State. If
a removal or retention is wrongful, Article 12 of the
Convention provides that when “a period of less than one
year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or
retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of
the child forthwith,” unless one of the Convention’s narrow
exceptions applies. 30 If more than a year has passed, the
relevant authority “shall also order the return of the child,
unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its
new environment.” 31
In its application, the Convention focuses on jurisdiction
instead of substantive issues of law to ensure the best-placed

26. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 30.
27. Id. at 226.
28. See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 742 (7th Cir. 2013).
29. Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
30. Id. art. 12.
31. Id.
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courts determine custody. 32 Courts in the place of the child’s
habitual residence determine the best interests of the child,
and the decision to return the child under the Convention
does not alter the existing allocation of custody rights. 33
Since courts in the place of the child’s habitual residence
have better knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
case as well as the substantive law, those courts determine
the merits of custody arrangements. 34 Equally, courts in
Contracting States respect the rights of custody and of access
under the laws of other Contracting States by not getting
into substantive custody disputes. 35 The need to adjudicate
substantive child custody issues in the most appropriate
forum explains using the child’s habitual residence as the
“main connecting factor” under the Convention. 36
Unfortunately, courts have struggled to avoid crossing into
“custody-type considerations,” particularly when considering
whether a child is “well-settled” and should not be
returned. 37
32. Id. art. 19; Redmond, 724 F.3d at 739 (“The Convention’s procedures are
not designed to settle international custody disputes, but rather to restore the
status quo prior to any wrongful removal or retention, and to deter parents from
engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases.”); Friedrich II, 78
F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[A] court in the abducted-to nation has
jurisdiction to decide the merits of an abduction claim, but not the merits of the
underlying custody dispute.”); Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 15, at 429.
33. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (“[T]he best interests of the child
are well served when decisions regarding custody rights are made in the country
of habitual residence.”).
34. Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 15, at 430.
35. Courts have more knowledge and experience regarding their own
domestic law. Deferring to a foreign court’s custody determinations instead of
going into substantive custody issues helps ensure international cooperation and
the prompt return of the child.
36. Schuz, supra note 7, at 111.
37. Berezowsky v. Rendon Ojeda, 652 F. App’x 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2016) (Elrod,
J., concurring); see Koehn, supra note 5, at 643 (“[S]everal courts have
acknowledged the fact-intensive nature of Hague Convention cases or the careful
dance associated with avoiding the underlying custody dispute.”). At the federal
level, such struggles come from courts’ lack of family law expertise and
familiarity with the Convention’s provisions. Id. at 644. Since federal courts lack
expertise, it “often results in inconsistent resolution of Hague Convention cases.”
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B. The Different Habitual Residence Approaches Within the
United States
There are three approaches to habitual residence: the
child-centered approach, the parental intent approach, and
the mixed approach.
1. The Child-Centered Approach
Under the child-centered approach, a child’s habitual
residence “depends on the child’s connections with the
country in question and not the parent’s connections or
intentions.” 38 For example, in Friedrich v. Friedrich, after
the German father evicted the American mother and the
child, they went to live on a U.S. army base in Germany
before the mother took the child to the United States. 39 The
Sixth Circuit determined that because the child was born in
Germany and had lived in Germany until his American
mother removed him to the United States, the child was
habitually resident in Germany. 40 The court did not consider
the mother’s intent to return with the child to the United
States and instead focused on the child’s past experiences. 41
The court noted that the facts and circumstances of the case
should determine habitual residence instead of the detailed
and technical rules governing domicile. 42 To determine a
child’s habitual residence, “[a] court must focus on the child,
not the parents, and examine past experience, not future

Id. at 645.
38. Rhona Schuz, Habitual Residence of Children Under the Hague Child
Abduction Convention, 13 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 1, 13 (2001).
39. Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich I), 983 F.2d 1396, 1398–99 (6th Cir.
1993); Schuz, supra note 38, at 13.
40. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1402.
41. Id. at 1401; see Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995)
(“[H]abitual residence is the place where [a child] has been physically present for
an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled
purpose’ from the child’s perspective.”).
42. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1401.
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intentions.” 43 Additionally, a child may have only one
habitual residence, and a change in habitual residence
requires “a change in geography and the passage of time.” 44
Since the child in Friedrich was born in Germany and had
always resided in Germany prior to his removal, the court
found the child’s habitual residence to be Germany. 45
The Sixth Circuit elaborated on this approach in Robert
v. Tesson, holding “a child’s habitual residence is a nation
where the child has been present long enough to allow
‘acclimatization,’ and where this presence has a ‘degree of
settled purpose from the child’s perspective.’” 46 The mother
in Robert removed twins from France to the United States.
Although the children had lived in both the United States
and France for substantial periods of time, the court focused
on the children’s “degree of acclimatization” in the United
States, finding the United States was where their presence
had “a degree of settled purpose.” 47
2. The Parental Intent Approach
Under the parental intent approach, children are
habitually resident where shared parental intent reflects a
settled purpose, and unilateral intent is insufficient to
change a child’s habitual residence. 48 If one parent has the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1402.
45. Id.
46. 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007).
47. Id. at 998.
48. Grau v. Grau, 780 F. App’x 787, 794 (11th Cir. 2019). Before Monasky,
courts generally followed the parental intent approach in the Ninth, Eleventh,
and Fifth circuits. Ronald H. Kauffman, Like Home: The New Definition of
Habitual Residence, 95 FLA. BAR J., no. 2, Mar./Apr. 2021, at 50, 52. The parental
intent approach to the habitual residence analysis considers “the present, shared
intentions of both [parents]” regarding their child’s presence in a country. Feder
v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that a four-year-old
child was habitually resident in Australia after living there for six months and
starting school where the parents had agreed to move to that country and to live
there with their son). The parental intent approach is “the most widely accepted
framework” and is sometimes known as the “Mozes framework.” See Joe
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right to decide where the child lives, then that parent’s intent
controls the child’s habitual residence, “irrespective of where
the child is actually living.” 49 When both parents have that
right, “neither may change the child’s place of habitual
residence without the consent of the other.” 50 For example,
in Grau v. Grau, the Eleventh Circuit found that four-yearold twins were habitually resident in the United States based
on their parents’ shared intent to realize “their mutual
‘dream’ of raising the twins in the United States” since it
reflected a “settled purpose.” 51 The family moved to the
United States for the father’s work shortly after the children
were born, and the move turned into a long-term plan. 52 The
parents agreed that the mother would start a business in
Florida and the father would return to Germany to work to
support the family. In Florida, “the children attended school,
participated in activities, and made friends,” but the mother
filed for divorce and moved the children to an undisclosed
address before the father sought the return of the children to
Germany. 53 Although the parents disagreed about their
intent, the district court had credited the mother’s testimony
that she “never intended for her or the children to move back
to Germany,” so the appellate court found the parents did not
share a mutual intent for their children to abandon their
habitual residence in the United States. 54
In Mozes v. Mozes, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that the
intentions of “the person or persons entitled to fix the place
of the child’s residence” should be considered instead of the
Digirolamo & Manal Cheema, Monasky v. Taglieri: The (International) Case for
A “True” Hybrid Approach, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 5–6 (2020).
49. Schuz, supra note 38, at 10.
50. Id.
51. Grau, 780 F. App’x at 793–94.
52. Id. at 790.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 794; see Kauffman, supra note 48, at 53 n.19 (noting in the Eleventh
Circuit, for a child’s habitual residence to change, “the parents must share an
intent to abandon the previous residence”).
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intentions of the child. 55 The parents were Israeli citizens
and had always lived in Israel with their four children when,
with the father’s consent, the mother and the children moved
to Los Angeles for a temporary stay. 56 The mother leased a
home in Beverly Hills, enrolled the children in school, and
purchased automobiles. 57 The father consented to the mother
and the children living in the United States for fifteen
months, but the parties disagreed about any subsequent
understanding. 58 The mother filed an action to dissolve the
marriage and sought custody of the children after a year in
the United States, but then the father petitioned for the
return of the children. 59 The court noted that having a
“settled intention to abandon one’s prior habitual residence
is a crucial part of acquiring a new one.” 60 A child can become
habitually resident in a new country through time and
contacts, but “courts should be slow to infer from such
contacts that an earlier habitual residence has been
abandoned.” 61 The shared settled purpose requirement
protects the aims of the Convention by making it more
difficult for “would-be abductor[s] to seek unilateral custody
over a child in another country.” 62 The Convention’s drafters
55. 239 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Monasky v. Taglieri,
140 S. Ct. 719 (2020).
56. Id. at 1069.
57. Id. The court compared the stay in the United States to an academic year
abroad, “in which thousands of families across the globe participate every year.”
Id. at 1083. The year abroad allows children to experience other cultures and to
form personal ties with other countries before returning to their home countries.
Id.
58. Id. at 1069.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1076; see Pfeiffer v. Bachotet, 913 F.3d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“We have set forth two requirements to alter a child’s habitual residence: (1) the
parents must share a ‘settled intention’ to leave the old habitual residence
behind; and (2) an ‘actual change in geography and the passage of a sufficient
length of time for the child to have become acclimatized’ must occur.”).
61. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079.
62. Id. Courts should not “determine whether a child is happy where it
currently is, but whether one parent is seeking unilaterally to alter the status
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sought to disincentivize child abduction, but “[t]he greater
the ease with which habitual residence may be shifted
without the consent of both parents, the greater the incentive
to try.” 63 Looking at whether a child is settled is too vague
because it can “allow findings of habitual residence based on
virtually any indication that the child has generally adjusted
to life there.” 64 Moreover, children adapt quickly, forming
intense attachments in short periods of time. 65 Since the
mother and children in Mozes moved to the United States
with the expectation that they would return home to Israel
after their stay abroad, the court found the district court had
given “insufficient weight to the importance of shared
parental intent under the Convention.” 66 The appellate court
remanded the case for the district court to consider whether
the children’s habitual residence had changed to the United
States due to shared intent to abandon Israel as their
habitual residence. 67
3. The Mixed Approach
The mixed approach refers to mixing parental intent
with a child’s ties and acclimatization. 68 While the mixed
approach considers a child’s ties and acclimatization,
parental intent still plays an important role, particularly in
cases involving young children. For example, in Whiting v.
Krassner, a custody agreement provided that the mother and
young child would return to the United States from Canada
after two years. 69 Without the mother’s knowledge, the
quo with regard to the primary locus of the child’s life.” Id.
63. Id.
64. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079.
65. See, e.g., Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding
that a six-year-old child had acquired habitual residence in England after a
summer because she was “well accustomed to her surroundings”).
66. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1084.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2013).
69. 391 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2004).
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father removed the child to New York. 70 The Third Circuit
noted that, unlike a formula, habitual residence “is a factintensive determination that necessarily varies with the
circumstances of each case.” 71 Nevertheless, the court agreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s approach and focused on parental
intent where “the child whose habitual residence is being
determined is of such a young age that he or she cannot
possibly decide the issue of residency for himself or
herself.” 72 In such cases, “acclimatization is not nearly as
important as the settled purpose and shared intent of the
child’s parents in choosing a particular habitual residence.” 73
The court found the agreement to live in Canada for two
years demonstrated a degree of settled purpose as well as
intent to abandon the United States as the child’s habitual
residence even though the agreement was temporary and
subject to conditions. 74
Under the Second Circuit’s approach in Gitter v. Gitter,
habitual residence first considers shared parental intent
before turning to “whether the evidence unequivocally points
to the conclusion that the child has acclimatized to the new
location and thus has acquired a new habitual residence,
notwithstanding any conflict with the parents’ latest shared
intent.” 75 Although the parents in Gitter did not intend for
the child to become habitually resident in Israel, the
appellate court remanded the case to determine whether the
child’s habitual residence had changed from the United
States. 76 The petitioner father had convinced the mother to
move to Israel for a year to try it, but after eleven months,
she said she wanted to remain in the United States during a
70. Id. at 543.
71. Id. at 546.
72. Id. at 548–49.
73. Id. at 550.
74. Id. at 549–50.
75. 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 136.
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family visit back in New York. 77 The father convinced her to
return to Israel, promising “that if she were still unhappy in
six months, she could return to the United States.” 78 A few
months later, purportedly on a vacation, the mother and the
child travelled to the United States, but the child did not
return to Israel. 79 In determining the child’s habitual
residence, the court looked to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Mozes, recognizing the importance of parental intent in
determining habitual residence. 80 The court agreed that the
analysis should start with parental intent but observed that
“[i]n nearly all of the cases that arise under the Convention,
however, the parents have come to disagree as to the place of
the child’s habitual residence.” 81 Next, courts must consider
“whether, notwithstanding the intent of those entitled to fix
the child’s habitual residence, the evidence points
unequivocally to the conclusion that the child has become
acclimatized to his new surroundings and that his habitual
residence has consequently shifted.” 82 In reaching its
decision, the court considered the Convention’s aim to
“dissuade parents and guardians from engaging in
gamesmanship with a child’s upbringing in order to secure
an advantage in an anticipated custody battle.” 83 Giving too
much weight to evidence of acclimatization over parental
agreement could result in manipulation where one parent
seeks to create ties during what the other parent considered
a temporary visit. 84 On the other hand, a child’s
acclimatization may be so complete that forcing the child to
return to the family’s intended residence will cause serious

77. Id. at 128–29.
78. Id. at 129.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 131; Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).
81. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 133.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 134.
84. Id.
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harm. 85 The court concluded the district court did not clearly
err in finding that the parents did not mutually intend to
make Israel the child’s permanent home because the move
was temporary and contingent on the mother’s happiness. 86
The court held that parental intent alone cannot establish a
child’s habitual residence. 87 Then, the court remanded the
case for the district court to consider whether the child was
habitually resident in Israel based on his ties. 88
II. MONASKY V. TAGLIERI:
THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST FOR HABITUAL
RESIDENCE AND ITS APPLICATION IN SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
As the pre-Monasky case law in the United States
demonstrates, habitual residence “is the central—often
outcome-determinative—concept on which the entire
[Convention] is founded.” 89 In Monasky, the Supreme Court
clarified that the appropriate test to determine a child’s
habitual residence is the totality-of-the-circumstances test,
harmonizing the different approaches. Section II.A considers
the facts and procedural history of Monasky by way of
background before turning to Supreme Court’s unanimous
adoption of the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 90 Section
II.B explores the application of the totality-of-thecircumstances test in subsequent case law.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 135.
87. Id. at 133.
88. Id. at 136.
89. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001); Koehn, supra note
5, at 651 (“[T]he ultimate disposition of a Hague Convention return petition
hinges on this finding.”).
90. See Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 732 (2020). Justice Thomas
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment because he would have reached
the same result based on the text of the Convention. Id. at 732 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment
because he reached the same result based on an independent interpretation of
the meaning of “habitual residence.” Id. at 734 (Alito, J., concurring).
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A. Monasky v. Taglieri: The Totality-of-the-Circumstances
Test
1. Background: Key Facts and Procedural History
Michelle Monasky and Domenico Taglieri married in the
United States in 2011 before later relocating to Italy in
2013. 91 After the couple found work in Italy, neither intended
to return to the United States. 92 Unfortunately, the marriage
deteriorated, and Taglieri became physically abusive,
allegedly forcing himself upon Monasky multiple times. 93
Monasky became pregnant with A.M.T. about a year after
the couple moved to Italy. 94 After the move, Monasky still did
not speak Italian and struggled with basic tasks. 95 While
Monasky began exploring returning to the United States,
applying for jobs in the United States, and looking into U.S.
divorce lawyers; she and Taglieri planned on caring for their
child in Italy. 96 After a disputed reconciliation, Monasky fled
with A.M.T. to the Italian police in 2015 and sought shelter
in a safe house, citing abuse by Taglieri and fears for her
life. 97 Two weeks later, Monasky took A.M.T, then two
months old, to her parent’s home in Ohio. 98
After her flight, an Italian court terminated Monasky’s
parental rights, and Taglieri petitioned for the return of
A.M.T. to Italy on the ground that Italy was the child’s
habitual residence. 99 The District Court for the Northern
91. Id. at 727 (majority opinion).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Taglieri v. Monasky, No. 1:15-cv-947, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195225, at
*4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2016), aff’d, 876 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated (Mar. 2), aff’d en banc on reh’g, 907 F.3d 404 (6th Cir.
2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 719 (2020).
96. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 724.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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District of Ohio found it implicit in Sixth Circuit precedent
that an infant will normally be habitually resident where the
matrimonial home is. 100 The court looked at evidence
supporting shared parental intent to raise A.M.T. in Italy. 101
First, Monasky and Taglieri moved to Italy for career
opportunities and to “live as a family.” 102 Second, even
though Monasky “contend[ed] that she never understood the
move to Italy to be permanent, it [was] undisputed that the
parties agreed to live in Italy for an undetermined period of
time.” 103 Nevertheless, Monasky argued that the “parties’
marriage irrevocably broke down in February 2015, before
A.M.T.’s birth, and afterward, there was no degree of
‘common purpose’ or ‘shared intent’ for the child to reside in
Italy.” 104 The court looked to the “nature and extent of any
such breakdown and whether the facts and circumstances
surrounding it [were] consistent” with cases in which “courts
have held that no habitual residence for the child came into
existence.” 105 For example, prior to A.M.T.’s birth, “Monasky
indicated to Taglieri that she wanted to divorce and return
to the United States with [their] daughter,” and Monasky
looked at quotes for moving from Italy to the United States
that same day. 106 Yet, despite wanting to leave Italy,
Monasky bought items for A.M.T. to use in Italy, including a
“rocking chair, stroller, car seat, and bassinet.” 107
Additionally, Monasky pursued an Italian driver’s license
and set up routine medical appointments for A.M.T. 108
Monasky took no concrete steps for her return with A.M.T.

100. Taglieri, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195225, at *24.
101. Id. at *24–25.
102. Id. at *24.
103. Id. at *24–25.
104. Id. at *26.
105. Id. at *26–27.
106. Id. at *27.
107. Id. at *28.
108. Id.
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to the United States besides emailing moving companies
about rates. 109 Overall, Monasky had no “crystalized plan in
place” to return to the United States until “Taglieri raised
his hand as if to hit Monasky” on March 31, 2015. 110 The
district court found that the parties’ shared intent was for
A.M.T. to live in Italy, where the parties had shared a
marital home without any definitive plan to return to the
United States. 111 Consequently, since Monasky had
continued to live in Italy following A.M.T.’s birth and had no
plans to bring A.M.T. to the United States until the final
altercation, A.M.T.’s habitual residence was Italy at the time
of removal. 112 The district court directed Monasky to take
appropriate steps for A.M.T.’s return to Italy. 113
109. Id. at *29–30.
110. Id. at *29.
111. Id. at *34.
112. Id. at *35.
113. Id. at *47. Although it is outside the scope of this Comment, Monasky
asserted the grave risk of harm defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention,
claiming that because she could not return to Italy due to pending criminal
charges against her, separating A.M.T. from her primary caregiver would place
A.M.T. in grave risk of harm. Id. at *38–40. The grave risk of harm defense under
Article 13(b) is that “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation.” See Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(b) . The Convention
does not define “grave risk of harm” or “intolerable situation.” In Simcox, the
Sixth Circuit stated that the exception “is to be interpreted narrowly, lest it
swallow the rule” as the summary return of the child was “designed to protect
the interests of the state of habitual residence in determining any custody
dispute, and to deter parents from unilaterally removing children in search of a
more sympathetic forum.” Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2007)
(finding the nature of the verbal and physical abuse by the father, the frequency
of the abuse, and the likelihood it would happen again without sufficient
protection justified not returning four children from the United States to Mexico
since their mother could not be compelled to return to Mexico). Despite the
presumption that the summary return of the child is in the child’s best interests,
the purposes of the Convention should defer to “the primary interest of any
person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or being placed
in an intolerable situation . . . by forcing the return of children who were the
direct or indirect victims of domestic violence.” Id. at 604–05 Although the
Monasky district court was “loathe to see the separation of a child from either of
its parents,” the court could not “factor this impact into its determination, as the
Sixth Circuit and several other courts have declined to find a ‘grave risk’ where
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit treated “the habitual
residence of a child as a question of fact” in line with the
language in the Pérez-Vera Report. 114 The court concluded
A.M.T. was not “in a position to acclimate to any one country
during her two months in this world.” 115 The court noted that
the habitual residence of the child will normally be the
country where the matrimonial home exists as “a fact of life
that we cannot change.” 116 In doing so, the court also rejected
the argument that infants should not have a habitual
residence as “the worst of all possible worlds” by depriving
infants of protection and “creating the risk of ‘abduction ping
pong’ at best, or making possession 100% of the law at
worst.” 117 In international child abduction cases,
“[s]ometimes the only way to resolve a complicated problem
is to recognize that there is no single solution.” 118 Since Italy
was the matrimonial home and A.M.T. was an infant at the
time of removal, the appellate court affirmed the district
the respondent claims that a return order separating the abducting parent from
the child would result in psychological damage to the child.” Taglieri, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 195225, at *40–41. No evidence indicated that Taglieri was ever
“physically violent towards A.M.T.” Id. at *44. Without clear and convincing
evidence that returning A.M.T. would place the child at a grave risk of harm, the
defense did not apply. Id. at *45. Courts are split over “the correct course of action
a court should take once it determines that a ‘grave risk of harm’ or an ‘intolerable
situation’ exists” in a case. Lauren Cleary, Note, Disaggregating the Two Prongs
of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention to Cover Unsafe and Unstable Situations,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2619, 2635 (2020). For more information on the grave risk of
harm and intolerable situation defenses, see generally id. For further analysis of
domestic violence concerns in Convention cases, see generally Andrew A. Zashin,
Domestic Violence by Proxy: A Framework for Considering a Child’s Return Under
the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction’s Article 13(b) Grave Risk of Harm Cases Post Monasky, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 571 (2021).
114. Taglieri v. Monasky, 907 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct.
719 (2020); see Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 15, at 445 (describing a child’s
habitual residence as a “question of pure fact”); see, e.g., Robert v. Tesson, 507
F.3d 981, 988 (6th Cir. 2007).
115. Taglieri, 907 F.3d at 408.
116. Id. at 410.
117. Id. at 411 (citation omitted).
118. Id.
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court’s order and did not disturb the district court’s finding
that A.M.T. was habitually resident in Italy. 119
2. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
Noting that the Convention does not define “habitual
residence,” the Supreme Court started its analysis by
determining “habitual” suggests a fact-sensitive inquiry
rather than a categorical one. 120 Looking to the intentions of
the drafters, the Convention’s “‘negotiation and drafting
history’ corroborates that a child’s habitual residence
depends on the specific circumstances of the particular
case.” 121 The drafters’ decision not to base habitual residence
on “formal legal concepts like domicile and nationality”
provides courts with “maximum flexibility” to respond to the
circumstances of the case and “to ensure that custody is
adjudicated in what is presumptively the most appropriate
forum—the country where the child is at home.” 122 The Court
also considered “the need for uniform international
interpretation of the Convention” and the “clear trend”
among treaty partners to take a fact-driven approach to
habitual residence based on the particular circumstances of
the case. 123
The Court held that the habitual residence
determination “does not turn on the existence of an actual
119. Id.
120. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 726 (2020).
121. Id. at 727.
122. Id.; see BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 89–90.
123. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 727–28 (citing, among others, 22 U.S.C.
§ 9001(b)(3)(B)); see Off. of the Children’s Law. v. Balev, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, 421,
¶ 50 (Can.) (“In recent years, many Hague Convention states have adopted a
hybrid approach. Absolute consensus has not yet emerged. But the clear trend is
to rejection of the parental intention approach and to adoption of the hybrid
approach. Recent decisions from the European Union, the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States endorse the hybrid approach.”);
In re A, [2013] UKSC 60, ¶ 54 (The court states that habitual residence “depends
upon numerous factors . . . with the purposes and intentions of the parents being
merely one of the relevant factors . . . . The essentially factual and individual
nature of the inquiry should not be glossed with legal concepts . . . .”).
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agreement” based on the text of the Convention and on the
Pérez-Vera Report. 124 Instead, “a child’s habitual residence
depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the
case.” 125 Consequently, Italy could “qualify as A.M.T.’s
‘habitual residence’ in the absence of an actual agreement by
her parents to raise her there[.]” 126 In clarifying how lower
courts should interpret the totality-of-the-circumstances
standard, the majority explained that “[t]he inquiry begins
with a legal question: What is the appropriate standard for
habitual residence?” 127 After identifying the totality-of-thecircumstances test, the lower court should “answer a factual
question: Was the child at home in the particular country at
issue?” 128 In cases involving children too young to
acclimatize, “the intentions and circumstances of caregiving
parents are relevant considerations,” but “[n]o single fact,
however, is dispositive across all cases.” 129 Despite different
approaches by lower courts, the standards they use to
determine a child’s habitual residence “share a ‘common’
understanding: The place where a child is at home, at the
time of removal or retention, ranks as the child’s habitual
residence.” 130 The Court rejected Monasky’s “actualagreement” argument as such a requirement would allow a
parent to unilaterally “block any finding of habitual
residence for an infant,” and it would “undermine the
Convention’s aim to stop unilateral decisions to remove
children across international borders.” 131 The Court also
rejected the argument that a bright-line rule would promote

124. See Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 726; Convention, supra note 1; Pérez-Vera
Report, supra note 15, at 445.
125. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 723.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 730.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 727.
130. Id. at 726.
131. Id. at 728.
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the prompt return of the child and deter would-be abductors
because it would involve a “winner-takes-all evidentiary
dispute over whether an agreement existed[.]” 132 In a factdriven inquiry, “courts must be ‘sensitive to the unique
circumstances of the case and informed by common
sense.’” 133 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s
judgment and declined to remand the case since the district
court had considered the totality of the circumstances. 134
Turning to the domestic violence concerns raised in the
case, the Court addressed Monasky’s argument that an
actual-agreement requirement would “protect children born
into domestic violence.” 135 Rather than imposing a
categorical requirement to combat domestic violence
concerns, the Court believed that “domestic violence should
be an issue fully explored in the custody adjudication upon
the child’s return.” 136 A categorical approach could exclude
certain children from the scope of the Convention, leaving
infants without a habitual residence. 137 As Monasky did not
challenge the district court’s findings that returning A.M.T.
would not put her at a grave risk of harm, the Court did not
address the domestic violence issues in the case. 138

132. Id. at 729.
133. Id. at 727 (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 744 (7th Cir.
2013)).
134. Id. at 731 (“Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court would
appraise the facts differently on remand.”).
135. Id. at 729.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Domestic violence is a serious problem, and the grave risk of harm
defense asserted in Monasky is one of the most litigated exceptions to the
summary return of the child in Convention cases. See Kucinski, supra note 14, at
40–41. For purposes of length and scope, this Comment does not address the
domestic violence implications of the Court’s decision. For purposes of length and
scope, this Comment does not address the domestic violence implications of the
Court’s decision.
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B. The Application of the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
in Subsequent Case Law
While habitual residence does not require actual
agreement between parents, “‘[p]hysical presence in a
country is not a dispositive indicator of an infant’s habitual
residence.” 139 In Grano v. Martin, the Second Circuit
followed Monasky and applied the totality-of-thecircumstances test. 140 The mother took the child from Spain
to the United States without the father’s consent, and the
Second Circuit concluded the district court did not clearly err
in finding the child’s habitual residence was Spain. 141 The
court also reiterated the Convention’s philosophy that “the
interests of the child are usually best served when custody
decisions are made in the courts of the home country.” 142
When determining the child’s habitual residence, the court
listed the factors from Monasky that courts may consider,
including “where a child has lived, the length of time there,
acclimatization, and the ‘purposes and intentions of the
parents.’” 143 As the parents in Grano had bought a one-way
ticket to Spain, did not keep bank accounts in the United
States, found a school for the child, and bought a house
together, the facts on the record supported the district court’s
finding of habitual residence in Spain; the court affirmed
accordingly. 144
Since no categorical requirements exist for habitual
residence, past parental agreement does not control when
other relevant factual circumstances exist. 145 In Pope v.
Lunday, the mother became pregnant with twins when living
139. 821 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (citing Monasky, 140
S. Ct. at 729).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 28.
142. Id. at 27 (citing Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 723).
143. Id. (quoting Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 728).
144. Id. at 28.
145. Pope v. Lunday, 835 F. App’x 968, 971–72 (10th Cir. 2020).
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in Brazil with the father, but she returned to the United
States at nineteen-to-twenty-weeks pregnant. 146 The father
understood the trip would last only a few weeks “to attend
social and business events,” but the mother took her pet cat
and did not return to Brazil. 147 The children were born in and
had lived their entire lives in Oklahoma when the father
petitioned for their return. 148 The father argued that he and
the mother had agreed the children would live in Brazil, so
Brazil was their place of habitual residence. 149 The court
cited evidence supporting shared parental intent to remain
in Brazil: the couple had “held a ceremony in Mexico and
obtained the public deed of stable union in Brazil,” the
mother had begun the process of getting a professional
license, she had obtained Brazilian health insurance and a
social security card, she had begun learning Portuguese, and
the couple had purchased a house. 150 The father asserted the
mother could not unilaterally change their agreement that
the then-unborn twins would live in Brazil. 151 Despite an in
utero agreement, the court rejected “the proposition that any
particular circumstance controls.” 152 The court believed the
parents’ intentions and circumstances were relevant but
recognized that “nothing requires an actual agreement
between the parties.” 153 The mother argued that the twins
had never even been to Brazil, and only in rare cases can a
court find an infant is habitually resident in a country where
the infant has never been. 154 As with actual agreement, the
court reasoned that an infant’s physical presence does not

146. Id. at 969.
147. Id. at 969–70.
148. Id. at 970.
149. Id. at 971.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 728–29 (2020)).
153. Id. (citing Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 726).
154. Id.
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control since there are no categorical requirements for
habitual residence. 155 While there had been shared parental
intent when the twins were “19 to 20 weeks in utero,” the
court affirmed the district court’s assessment that the
agreement at that time did not bind the mother forever. 156
The past agreement was “not sufficient to override every
other undisputed fact in [the] case, all of which point[ed] in
one direction: away from Brazil as the place of habitual
residence.” 157 Finding the children were habitually resident
in the United States, the appellate court affirmed the district
court’s determination that the mother did not wrongfully
retain the twins. 158
The totality-of-the-circumstances test treats parental
intent as just another factor post-Monasky. 159 In Smith v.
Smith, the Fifth Circuit overruled its prior emphasis on
shared parental intent over other factors. 160 Prior to
Monasky, the Fifth Circuit “looked to the parents’ ‘shared
intent’ as a threshold test for determining a child’s habitual
residence.” 161 Now, courts must determine if the abductor
wrongfully removed the child from his or her habitual
residence based on the totality of the circumstances instead
of parental intent alone. 162 Smith involved children
wrongfully removed from Argentina to Texas. Evidence
demonstrated that the family viewed the United States as
the children’s habitual residence: both parties were United
States citizens, the father’s work contract referenced home
leave to San Francisco, and the mother continued to own

155. Id.
156. Id. at 972.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 976 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020).
160. Id. at 561 n.1.
161. Id. at 561 (quoting Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2012)).
162. Id.
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land in Texas. 163 Additionally, the children had gone to an
“American style” school in Argentina, and the family never
purchased a home in Argentina. 164 Although the lower court
found the children were habitually resident in Texas based
on parental intent, the Fifth Circuit affirmed based on the
totality-of-the-circumstances test. 165
III. POST-MONASKY:
THE FUTURE OF THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Section III.A endorses the mixed approach to habitual
residence while critiquing the different approaches. Next,
Section III.B considers the application of the totality-of-thecircumstances test in subsequent case law. Finally, Section
III.C addresses where the habitual residence analysis
currently stands moving forward.
A. The Mixed Approach Best Serves the Aims of the
Convention Through Maximum Flexibility Based on the
Circumstances of the Individual Cases
1. While Flexible, the Child-Centered Approach Risks
Trespassing into Substantive Custody Matters or
Creating Artificial Ties and Only Works in Cases
Involving Older Children
Without parental intent, the child-centered approach
risks crossing into substantive custody matters. The childcentered approach looks at a child’s ties and other objective
factors based on the factual nature of habitual residence. 166
While habitual residence is a question of fact based on the
circumstances of the case, courts must not engage in a
domicile-like approach to acclimatization to avoid crossing
into substantive custody disputes. A pure child-centered
approach makes it too tempting for courts to turn what the
163. Id. at 560.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 563.
166. Schuz, supra note 38, at 15.

2022]

FUTURE OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE

943

Convention’s drafters intended to be a question of
jurisdiction into a custody determination. The summary
return mechanism sends children back to their place of
habitual residence, so the most appropriate court—the court
in the place of the child’s habitual residence—can decide
custody matters. Children may develop meaningful ties
during short stays, but those ties require a settled purpose
to avoid children becoming habitually resident after a
temporary visit. 167 When courts weigh factors without
considering parental intent, it may create absurd results. 168
To avoid crediting artificial ties, weighing factors should
include parental intent. 169 Though courts should strive to not
uproot a child twice, the settled purpose should include the
parents’ perspective to avoid a custody or domicile-like
inquiry. Equally, as the court stated in Gitter, giving too
much weight to evidence of acclimatization over parental
agreement could allow manipulation when one parent seeks
to create ties during what one parent intended as a
temporary visit. 170 Overall, the approach correctly considers
the factual circumstances, but parental intent steers the
analysis away from a custody or domicile-like determination
167. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding “a child’s
habitual residence is the nation where, at the time of their removal, the child has
been present long enough to allow acclimatization, and where this presence has
a ‘degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective’” (quoting Feder v. EvansFeder, 63 F.3d 217, 244 (3d Cir. 1995))). Instead of looking at settled purpose
from the parents’ perspective, the approach flips the inquiry, focusing on the
child’s perspective.
168. In Mozes, the court compared the children’s visit to the United States to
an academic year abroad. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001).
Children study abroad to experience other cultures and to form personal ties with
other countries, but it would be an undue expansion of habitual residence to hold
a child could become habitually resident in another country after what a family
intended to be a temporary trip. See, e.g., Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 61
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that a six-year-old child had acquired habitual residence
in England after a summer because she was “well accustomed to her
surroundings”).
169. The easier a parent can unilaterally create artificial ties, the greater
incentive to remove or retain a child. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079.
170. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2005).
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based on acclimatization.
The child-centered approach best suits cases involving
older children or where courts lack objective evidence of
parental intent, but cases involving young children require
more emphasis on parental intent. 171 A fact-intensive
approach to habitual residence favors objective criteria, and
no guidance instructs courts how much weight to give each
factor in the analysis. 172 The Convention itself recognizes
and gives weight to the objections of sufficiently mature
children. 173 Where a child can form real attachments, it may
be in the child’s best interests to find that their habitual
residence has changed through the passage of time, making
a child-centered approach more appropriate. Despite a lack
of predictability and certainty, weighing factors without any
one factor being dispositive allows for flexibility depending
on the facts and circumstances of individual cases. 174 Older
children have sufficient maturity to form meaningful
attachments and sufficient intent to acquire a new habitual
residence, so a child-centered approach respects their
autonomy. 175 By contrast, only focusing on a child’s ties risks
leaving young children without a habitual residence, so any
complete analysis must consider parental intent. 176 As the
Court stated in Monasky, “[b]ecause children, especially
those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, depend on
171. Digirolamo & Cheema, supra note 48, at 8–9.
172. Schuz, supra note 38, at 16. Factors include, for example, participation in
academic activities, social engagements, and whether the child formed
“meaningful connections” in the country. Ahmed v. Ahmed, 867 F.3d 682, 689
(6th Cir. 2017).
173. Convention, supra note 1, art. 13.
174. See Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 727 (2020) (discussing habitual
residence as a connecting factor and the need for “maximum flexibility” to “ensure
that custody is adjudicated in what is presumptively the most appropriate
forum—the country where the child is at home”); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra
note 7, at 89–90.
175. Schuz, supra note 38, at 17.
176. See Ahmed, 867 F.3d at 687 (noting that young children cannot
acclimatize to their surroundings).
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their parents as caregivers, the intentions and circumstances
of caregiving parents are relevant considerations.” 177
2. The Parental Intent Approach Fails to Adequately
Take a Child’s Acclimatization into Account and May
Lead to Winner-Takes-All Credibility
Determinations
On the other side of the spectrum, the parental intent
approach “contradicts the physical factual nature of habitual
residence” and fails to give appropriate weight to a child’s
acclimatization. 178 Focusing on parental intent can block a
well-settled child from acquiring a new habitual residence in
the absence of actual agreement. 179 The parental intent
approach narrowly fixes a child’s habitual residence based on
parental agreement and settled purpose, and it limits
situations in which a child’s habitual residence can change
without shared parental intent or a settled intention to
abandon a habitual residence. At first glance, a heavy
emphasis on shared parental intent makes sense since
children do not decide where they live. Back in Part I, we
explored the more straightforward reality in the 1970s that
children lived in the marital home or with the custodial
parent, so a child’s habitual residence was the marital home
or with the custodial parent. 180 Although the narrow
parental intent approach might appear to “fit in best with
the approach” of the Convention, “it is now widely accepted
that parental rights exist only insofar as they are necessary
for the welfare of the child.” 181 Simply returning the child
expedites proceedings and deters would-be abductors, but
other factors, including the objections of sufficiently mature
children, deserve consideration. 182 Returning a child with
177. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 727.
178. Schuz, supra note 7, at 137.
179. Digirolamo & Cheema, supra note 48, at 7.
180. See discussion supra Section I.A.
181. Schuz, supra note 38, at 11.
182. Convention, supra note 1, art. 13 (recognizing that the objections of
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strong attachments risks uprooting the child twice when
they have genuinely acclimatized to their new environment,
leading to further distress. Specifically, “it is possible that
the child’s acclimatization to the location abroad will be so
complete that serious harm to the child can be expected to
result from compelling his return to the family’s intended
residence.” 183 The summary return mechanism sends a child
back to their place of habitual residence for the most
appropriate courts to decide child custody disputes, 184 but
looking at a child’s ties and acclimatization does not amount
to a substantive custody determination.
A heavy emphasis on parental intent also leads to
winner-takes-all credibility determinations based on
subjective intent. As a starting point, courts should give
effect to shared parental intent regarding habitual
residence. 185 Yet, to determine whether shared intent
existed, courts must sometimes decide which parent’s
version of events to believe. With conflicting evidence on both
sides, a court must “decide which evidence is weightier.” 186
When a relationship breaks down, many parents do “not see
eye to eye on much of anything by the end.” 187 Looking to
disputed intent opens the doors to large amounts of evidence
even though shared parental intent alone does not control a
child’s habitual residence. 188 These side-show debates about
children who are sufficiently mature may be taken into consideration); Schuz,
supra note 38, at 11. Schuz notes that “under the parental rights model” a mature
child’s views “will not be relevant in determining his habitual residence.” Id.
183. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2005).
184. See, e.g., Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 739 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The
Convention’s procedures are not designed to settle international custody
disputes, but rather to restore the status quo prior to any wrongful removal or
retention, and to deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in
custody cases.”).
185. Schuz, supra note 7, at 135.
186. Schuz, supra note 38, at 12.
187. Taglieri v. Monasky, 907 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct.
719 (2020).
188. See Schuz, supra note 7, at 138 (recommending shared intent only be
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parental agreements prolong returning children. 189 Courts
should factor objective, undisputed evidence of parental
intent or agreement into the habitual residence analysis, but
relying on credibility determinations might lead to forum
shopping for a jurisdiction that might be more sympathetic
to the abductor or left-behind parent’s version of events. By
creating an incentive for would-be abductors, winner-takesall battles fail to protect young children who cannot
acclimatize to their environments. 190
3. The Mixed Approach Provides Flexibility Based on
the Circumstances of the Case and Follows a Clear
International Trend
The mixed approach to habitual residence best achieves
the aims of the Convention by avoiding categorical
distinctions and adapting to a wider range of factual
scenarios. 191 Both the text of the Convention and the
intentions of the drafters support the fact-heavy analysis
advocated by the mixed approach in Monasky. 192 The
approach considers both parental intent and the child’s
acclimatization as factors, and no one factor controls the

relevant “(i) in ‘borderline’ cases” where the child’s habitual residence matches
the agreement; “(ii) where it is very clear on the facts that an agreement existed;
and (iii) there is no serious suggestion that the agreement was not made
voluntarily”).
189. See id. at 137 (discussing power imbalances, agreements against public
policy, and agreements inconsistent with the welfare of the child).
190. See Taglieri, 907 F.3d at 410.
191. See Off. of the Children’s Law. v. Balev, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, 421, ¶ 62
(Can.) (noting a “hybrid approach . . . promotes prompt custody and access
decisions in the most appropriate forum, and thus offers the best hope of prompt
return of the child. The parental intention and child-centered approaches may,
on their face, seem less complex and hence more likely to lead to speedy
determination of the habitual residence of the child. But the reality is different.
The parental intention approach in practice often leads to detailed and conflicting
evidence as to the intentions of the parents.”).
192. The text of the Convention and the intentions of the drafters both support
a heavy factual inquiry without categorical requirements. See Pérez-Vera Report,
supra note 15, at 445.
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analysis. 193 Looking at the totality of the circumstances
under Monasky, a court weights parental intent and a child’s
acclimatization to “answer a factual question: Was the child
at home in the particular country at issue?” 194 In cases, like
Monasky, involving young children, the flexibility ensures
parental intent receives sufficient weight when children are
too young to acclimatize. 195 Taking a more holistic approach
to habitual residence walks the line between a strict
approach to deter abduction and a broad approach focused
on individual children’s interests. Whereas the parental
intent approach ignores the objections of older, mature
children, the mixed approach takes such objections into
account. 196 In addition, where the child-centered approach
risks crossing into substantive custody issues, the mixed
approach gives more weight to parental intent depending on
the circumstances. Nevertheless, courts may give too much
weight to either parental intent or acclimatization in their
analysis. Despite the risk of inappropriate weighing in some
cases, the approach gives courts the flexibility to truly take
into account all of the facts and circumstances of a case. Since
no set formula exists for habitual residence, a fact-heavy
analysis avoids abstract legal concepts and categorical
requirements. 197
Additionally, a “clear trend” exists among treaty
partners to take a fact-driven approach to habitual residence
based on the particular circumstances of the case. 198 The
mixed approach brings the United States into international
consensus with other Contracting States. By joining the clear
193. Digirolamo & Cheema, supra note 48, at 10.
194. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 730 (2020).
195. Id. at 727.
196. See Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2005).
197. See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 746 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e think
it unwise to set in stone the relative weights of parental intent and the child’s
acclimatization. The habitual-residence inquiry remains essentially fact-bound,
practical, and unencumbered with rigid rules, formulas, or presumptions.”).
198. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 727–28.
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trend among Contracting States, the mixed approach serves
“the need for uniform international interpretation of the
Convention.” 199 Encouraging uniform interpretation and
application of the Convention increases predictability in the
Convention’s application on an international level and
protects the best interests of children through international
cooperation. 200 Moreover, if all Contracting States adopted
the mixed-approach, then this uniformity would discourage
forum shopping. Since habitual residence serves as a
threshold determination under the Convention, different
approaches lead to different overall outcomes. The
Convention aimed to combat international child abduction
through international cooperation, and an international
standard facilitates that cooperation.
In sum, the mixed approach takes the best of both worlds
and allows for greater flexibility in Convention cases while
still maintaining a separation between jurisdiction and
substantive custody determinations. An international
standard clarifies the analysis for all Contracting States and
facilitates international cooperation.
B. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test in Monasky
Harmonized the Habitual Residence Analysis in the
United States
Ensuring flexibility post-Monasky, courts have avoided
overly narrow categorical requirements. 201 In Grano, the
Second Circuit repeated that habitual residence does not
require an actual agreement between the parents but that

199. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 727.
200. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Without
intelligibility and consistency in its application, parents are deprived of crucial
information they need to make decisions, and children are more likely to suffer
the harms the Convention seeks to prevent.”); see 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(3).
201. One court described the post-Monasky framework for determining
habitual residence as “less rigid,” balancing parental intent and acclimatization
in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test. See Chambers v. Russell, No.
1:20CV498, 2020 WL 5044036, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2020).
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“physical presence in a country is not a dispositive indicator
of an infant’s habitual residence.” 202 Factfinding courts
decide habitual residence as courts of first instance, so the
court deferred to the district court based on the
circumstances of the case. 203 The interpretation of the
totality-of-the-circumstances test in Grano toes the line
between giving too much weight to the child’s acclimatization
and geography or to parental intent. The facts showed the
child in Grano was at home in Spain: the parents had bought
a one-way ticket to Spain, did not keep bank accounts in the
United States, found a school for the child, and bought a
house together. 204 The court weighed the factors at play in
the case and respected clear parental intent backed up by
objective evidence.
Smith
demonstrates
that
the
totality-of-thecircumstances test does not radically change the habitual
residence analysis by including objective evidence of
acclimatization. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit overruled
its prior emphasis on “parents’ shared intent over other
factors” in favour of the totality-of-the-circumstances test
post-Monasky. 205 In Smith, the Fifth Circuit considered
parental intent along with objective evidence: both parties
were United States citizens, the father’s work contact
referenced home leave to San Francisco, the mother
continued to own land in Texas, the children had gone to an
“American style” school in Argentina, and the family had
never purchased a home in Argentina. 206 The family
intended to temporarily live in Argentina, and the children
did not acclimatize to life in Argentina. Even though the
lower court had applied the parental intent approach, the

202. Grano v. Martin, 821 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order)
(citing Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 729 (2020)).
203. Id. at 27–28.
204. Id. at 28.
205. Smith v. Smith, 976 F.3d 558, 561 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020).
206. Id. at 560.
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Fifth Circuit reached the same result on appeal. Based on
objective evidence, the children were not settled in
Argentina, and the court correctly considered clear evidence
indicating the children were habitually resident in the
United States.
Pope serves as a reminder that the Convention does not
apply to all child-custody disputes just because they have an
international element. 207 The Convention looks at whether
an abductor wrongfully removed a child from or retained
them away from their place of habitual residence
immediately before the wrongful removal or retention. Pope
turned on the fact that there was no wrongful removal or
retention from a place of habitual residence. When the thenpregnant mother returned to the United States, the children
did not exist yet. The reasoning in the district court’s opinion
illustrates the difference between habitual residence and a
custody dispute. At the district court level, the father never
argued that the children were habitually resident in Brazil
while they were in utero. 208 Since the children had never
been to Brazil, the district court rejected the father’s
argument that the children became habitually resident in
Brazil when they were born due to shared parental intent. 209
The case might have been different had the mother removed
new-born children from Brazil, the place of the parties’
marital home. Then, shared intent might have controlled,
and the twins would have then been habitually resident in
Brazil. As the district court noted, “a child cannot be
wrongfully ‘retained’ away from a place unless they were
first a habitual resident of that place.” 210 The district court
207. See Pope v. Lunday, No. CIV-19-01122-PRW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
220406, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2019) (“[B]y limiting its application to cases
involving retention of a child away from the child’s place of habitual residence,
. . . the Convention’s text indicates that it does not apply to all child-custody
disputes with an international element.”), aff’d, 835 F. App’x 968 (10th Cir. 2020).
208. Id. at *7.
209. Id. at *7–8.
210. Id. at *8.
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recognized that the case did not involve a wrongful removal
or retention, 211 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed based on the
totality-of-the-circumstances test. 212 The appellate court also
correctly rejected the petitioner father’s actual agreement
argument. 213 In cases involving infants and young children,
parental intent requires more weight in the habitual
residence analysis since the children are too young to form
meaningful ties, but giving weight to parental intent does not
create an actual agreement requirement. Pope reiterates
both that the Convention only deals with jurisdiction to
ensure concerted cooperation among Contracting States to
benefit children generally and that the courts in the place of
the child’s habitual residence make substantive custody
determinations in the best interests of that individual child.
C. The Future of the Habitual Residence Analysis in the
United States
The totality-of-the-circumstances test follows the clear
international trend in favor of a mixed approach, ensuring
uniform application and interpretation of the Convention
and preventing forum shopping. 214 Monasky harmonized the
habitual residence analysis in the United States, resolving
the circuit split between the parental intent, child-centered,
and mixed approaches. As this Comment argued, the mixed
approach best serves the aims of the Convention moving
forward through its flexibility. The drafters intended
habitual residence to involve a heavy factual inquiry, and the
totality-of-the-circumstances
test
avoids
categorical
requirements in favor of objective factual evidence. Since
Monasky, lower courts have refused to impose artificial
requirements in Convention cases, moving the United States
into international consensus. In most cases, the result seems
211. Id. at *3–5.
212. Pope v. Lunday, 835 F. App’x 968, 972–73 (10th Cir. 2020).
213. Id. at 972.
214. See Digirolamo & Cheema, supra note 48, at 4.

2022]

FUTURE OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE

953

to be the same under the new test because no one factor is
dispositive, so courts need only weight the factors before
making a call based on the facts of the case. For example, the
lower court in Smith had determined the children were
habitually resident in the United States based on the
parental intent approach. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed under the totality-of-the-circumstances test since
the children were not settled in Argentina. 215 While the court
overruled its previous precedent, the analysis did not change
the outcome and the importance of parental intent in that
case because it focused on all objective criteria.
Moving forward, courts should refrain from taking the
totality-of-the-circumstances test too far and turning
Convention cases into substantive custody disputes. 216 As
the district court pointed out in Pope, the Convention deals
with wrongful removals and retentions from a child’s
habitual residence and not custody disputes that have an
international element. With these concerns in mind, a more
flexible and holistic approach can benefit individual children
while still safeguarding the best interests of children
generally.
CONCLUSION
As a threshold determination, habitual residence
controls the outcomes in Convention cases, and case law
underscores its importance as a connecting factor. As Part I
discussed, the Convention does not define habitual
residence, and courts in the United States took divergent
approaches in their analyses prior to Monasky, applying the
215. Smith v. Smith, 976 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2020).
216. Aluker v. Simin Yan, No. 1:20-cv-1117, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51495, at
*19 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2021) (“The Court is mindful that the Hague Convention
seeks to grant courts of the receiving jurisdiction the circumscribed authority to
determine the merits of an abduction claim, and that the treaty is not designed
as a vehicle to dispose of an underlying custody dispute.”); see Convention, supra
note 1, art. 19; 22 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(4); Friedrich I, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir.
1993).
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parental intent, child-centered, and mixed approaches. By
laying down the new totality-of-the-circumstances test in
Monasky, the Supreme Court harmonized the habitual
residence analysis. The totality-of-the-circumstances test
clarified that courts should take a mixed approach to
habitual residence, treating parental intent and
acclimatization as factors for a court to consider without
giving any one factor undue weight. Increased flexibility
allows the mixed approach to adapt to cases involving both
young and sufficiently mature children. This Comment
argues that a mixed approach best achieves the aims of the
Convention by avoiding categorical requirements and
keeping habitual residence as a fact-based analysis.
Although it advocated including a child’s ties and
acclimatization in the analysis, this Comment also cautions
against unduly expanding the analysis into a domicile-like
inquiry or substantive custody determination and
emphasized the importance of parental intent. Under
Monasky, habitual residence has no categorical
requirements, and, post-Monasky, courts have applied the
totality-of-the-circumstances test based on the facts and
circumstances of the cases before them without making any
one factor outcome determinative. Pope serves as a welcome
reminder that Convention cases only deal with jurisdiction
to allow the most appropriate court to determine custody for
individual children. Overall, the new standard modernizes
the habitual residence analysis under the Convention and
ensures maximum flexibility to meet the various challenges
and changes in modern society moving forward.

